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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
well-organized uniform rules adopted and promulgated by the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)?
Answer:
Ratification of the Protocols will not directly affect current ICAO stan-
dards and recommended practices. However, we believe that U.S. repu-
diation of the Montreal Protocols-which were largely the product of U.S.
urging and leadership-would impair U.S. credibility, influence, and au-
thority in future international aviation negotiations in ICAO and
elsewhere.5
MARIAN NASH LEICH*
A NEW UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING THE
RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
Introduction
The ratification of international human rights treaties is critical to the world-
wide observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Na-
tions General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of ratification and have frequently encouraged states
to ratify the relevant international instruments. Despite these efforts, acceptance
of human rights treaties has been uneven; a considerable number of states have
failed to ratify.
Recognizing that a regular mechanism for encouraging ratification would
be more effective than general exhortations, the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a subsidiary body of the Com-
mission on Human Rights, established in 1979 a sessional working group to
consider ways and means of encouraging acceptance of human rights treaties.
The procedures of the Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal
Acceptance of Human Rights Instruments were modeled on the highly suc-
cessful methods used by the International Labour Organisation to encourage
its members to accede to labor standards. In 1980 and 1981, the working group
began by systematically considering the written explanations of governments
as to impediments they had encountered in ratifying human rights treaties and
by receiving representatives from several countries to discuss these difficulties.
This Note will discuss the rationale for the establishment of the working
group, the group's accomplishments thus far, and recent debate concerning its
authority. Finally, suggestions will be made for future objectives on which the
group may profitably focus.
Importance and Appropriateness of Encouraging Ratification
In keeping with its mandate to promote universal respect for human rights,
the General Assembly has promulgated over 35 standard-setting treaties, which
set forth obligations to be undertaken by ratifying countries for ensuring the
5 Dept. of State File No. P82 006-0592.
* Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.
[Vol. 76
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
observance of human rights.' The General Assembly acknowledged in its often
cited Resolution 32/130 (1977) that
[i]t is of paramount importance for the promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms that member States undertake specific obligations
through accession to or ratification of international instruments in this
field; consequently the standard setting work within the United Nations
system in the field of human rights and the universal acceptance and
implementation of the relevant international instruments should be en-
couraged.2
Recognition of the importance of encouraging ratification of international
human rights treaties is not new to the United Nations. The General Assembly
and the Commission on Human Rights have urged member states to accept
these instruments on numerous occasions. 3 But despite the frequency and el-
oquence of the general exhortations to ratify, ratifications continue to be made
at only a moderate pace.4 Clearly, the goals of widespread ratification and
implementation of human rights treaties cannot be met by relying on general
resolutions requesting ratification.
Establishment of the Working Group
At its 32d session in 1979, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities adopted Resolution 1B (XXXII), which
established the Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Acceptance
of Human Rights Instruments. 5 The Sub-Commission gave the working group
a threefold mandate: (1) to make requests, through the Secretary-General, to
governments that had not yet ratified the principal instruments that they inform
the Sub-Commission of circumstances or difficulties preventing ratification or
1 See Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, UN Doe. ST/HR/Rev.1
(1978).
2 GA Res. 32/130, 32 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 150, UN Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
3 See, e.g., urging ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination: GA Res. 3225, 29 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 86, UN Doc. A/9631
(1974); GA Res. 34/28, 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 166, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979); urging
ratification of the Human Rights Covenants and Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political
Covenant: GA Res. 3270, 29 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 90, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974); GA Res.
34/45, 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 169, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979); urging ratification of the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Human
Rights Comm'n Res. 6, 37 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 201, UN Doe. E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
4 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS: LIST OF SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS,
ETC. ASAT 31 DECEMBER 1979, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/13, at 111 (1980); updated through
June 15, 1981, by UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/463 (1981).
Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
on its Thirty-second Session, Res. 1B, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1350 (1979); see UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/L.716 (1979). Eight nongovernmental organizations submitted a statement to the Sub-Com-
mission supporting the establishment of the working group and stressing the need for improved
methods of encouraging ratification of human rights treaties. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO/80
and Add.1 (1979). The resolution was adopted by a vote of 17 to 2 with two abstentions. Jos6
Martinez Cobo of Ecuador and Dumitru Ceausu of Romania voted against the resolution. Mario
Amadeo of Argentina and Hicri Fisek of Turkey abstained.
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adherence; (2) to examine replies and, if necessary for further clarification, to
invite representatives from such governments for discussions with the working
group; and (3) to consider what assistance the United Nations night offer to
enable them to ratify as soon as possible. The working group was to accomplish
its purposes during regular Sub-Commission sessions, which would avoid the
expense of presessional meetings. It was to direct its attention to certain human
rights instruments enumerated in the resolution 6 and to such other instruments
as might be designated by the Sub-Commission.
Pursuant to Resolution 1B (XXXII) of the Sub-Commission, the Secretary-
General in December 1979 asked governments that had not ratified the treaties
to forward the specified explanatory information. 7 Through the report on its
32d session, the Sub-Commission in the spring of 1980 informed the Com-
mission on Human Rights of the creation of the sessional working group." The
Commission offered no objection, taking note of the Sub-Commission's report
without a vote.
9
The Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Acceptance of
Human Rights Instruments held its first meetings during the 33d session of
the Sub-Commission in the fall of 1980. During the interim, 20 countries had
responded to the Secretary-General's initial request for information. The group
examined the replies and representatives of Australia, France, and the Neth-
erlands appeared before it with oral clarifications of their countries' positions.
10
These representatives explained the remaining obstacles to ratification in
their respective countries. A common difficulty was the question of extrater-
ritorial criminal responsibility arising from the Convention against Apartheid.11
The group ended the session with plans to discuss the designation of additional
instruments for attention at the next session. The Sub-Commission took note
of the working group's report without resolution, decided to allot more time
to future sessions, and requested that the Secretary-General make a study of
the issue of extraterritorial criminal responsibility.12
6 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Fcrms of Racial
Discrimination; the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; the
Slavery Convention; the Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed in Geneva on September
26, 1976; and the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and
the Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery.
7 Note Verbale by the Secretary-General, UN Ref. No. G/SO 234 (17-4) (1979).
8 Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 5, considered at the Commission's 1 559th to 1563d
meetings.
9 Human Rights Comm'n Dec. No. 7, 36 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3) 202, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1408 (1980).
10 Report of the sessional Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Acceptance of
Human Rights Instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/453 (1980).
1 See Note by the Secretary-General containing a summary of information submitted by Gov-
ernments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452 and Adds.1, 2 (1980).
12 Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
on its Thirty-third Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1413, at 84-85 (1980).
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Scope of Authority Questioned at the 1981 Human Rights Commission
In February and March 1981, the Commission on Human Rights held its
37th session in Geneva; the report of the Sub-Commission received close at-
tention and was the subject of considerable debate.1 3 The representative from
Brazil, Jardim Gagliardi, criticized the Sub-Commission's work in some in-
stances as beyond its terms of reference.1 4 In particular, he assailed the Sub-
Commission for communicating directly with member states and for adopting
resolutions and recommendations with budgetary effects that had not first been
submitted for authorization by the Commission and ECOSOC.
After some debate, the Commission finally adopted a resolution reaffirming
the Sub-Commission's significant role. Although the Commission referred to
the debate surrounding the issue of competence, it only invited the Sub-Com-
mission to take note and to bear in mind its tasks.' 5 Thus, the Commission did
not take steps to delimit or redefine the Sub-Commission's terms of reference.
The working group on treaty ratification was not even mentioned in the res-
olution. Also at the 37th session, the Commission considered the Draft Medium-
Term Plan for the Human Rights Programme for the Period 1984-1989, which
was submitted for comment by the Secretary-General. 16 In setting out the
general orientation of the program, the drafters "expected that useful contri-
butions to the further ratification of international instruments will be made by
the Sub-Commission's Working Group on the ratification of international stan-
dards in the field of human rights."
17
The Working Group Meets Again
In August and September 1981, the working group and the Sub-Commission
considered the questions raised in February and March by several Commission
members. Members of the Sub-Commission supported its right to communicate
directly with member states on human rights issues, as it had done for many
years without objection. At the same time, the working group met for six
sessions, carefully continued its country-by-country review of governmental
replies, discussed the adequacy of the replies from the point of view of com-
pleteness and substance, and reconfirmed its authority to discuss replies directly
with governments by inviting Sweden and Syria to participate in its deliber-
ations.1 8 Neither Sweden nor Syria interposed any objections.
Based upon the recommendations of the working group, the Sub-Commission
adopted a resolution by a vote of 20 in favor, none against, and only the Soviet
13 37 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 160, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
14 See UN Doc. E/CNA/SR.1592, at 5-10 (1981).
15 Human Rights Comm'n Res. 17, 37 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 219, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1475 (1981); see UN Doe. E/CN.4/SR.1635, at 8-11 (1981).
16 Note by the Secretary-General, Review of the Draft Medium-Term Plan for the Period 1984-
1989, UN Doe. E/CN.4/1424, Annex (1980).
17 Id. at 3. The Human Rights Commission took note of the plan. Human Rights Comm'n Dec.
No. 9, 37 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 5) 246, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
18 Report of the sessional Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Acceptance of
Human Rights Instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.785 (1981).
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expert abstaining, that continued the efforts of the working group by asking
the Secretary-General to renew in 1981 the requests of 1979 and 1980 for
governments to explain their difficulties in ratifying the principal human rights
treaties.' 9 The Sub-Commission sought to make the Secretary-General's inquiry
even more pointed by individualizing the notes verbales to governments, that
is, by drawing attention to those specific treaties each government had not yet
ratified. The United States, for example, has signed but not ratified many of
the principal human rights treaties.20 The Sub-Commission's resolution also
requested that the Secretary-General invite the Governments of the Philippines,
Rwanda, Iran, the Solomon Islands, and Suriname to supply additional infor-
mation because the working group was not satisfied with the previous responses
from those countries. The Sub-Commission resisted efforts to expand the man-
date of the working group to include other human rights treaties, but decided
to reconsider this issue at its next session.
21
All in all, the working group continued its work with the support of the Sub-
Commission. Several states, including Australia which had appeared before the
working group in 1980, had ratified the human rights instruments by 1981.
While the working group has not yet generated substantive discussion of the
general problems raised by ratification, which one might expect in the future,
it has begun to establish itself as a relatively innovative institution for achieving
the ratification, and thus ultimately the implementation, of human rights stan-
dards.
Legitimacy of the Working Group
The Brazilian delegate to the 1981 Human Rights Commission called into
question the very heart of the working group's mandate: the mechanism of
soliciting information from nonratifying states. This challenge to the Sub-Com-
mission's competence presents two issues. First, does the Sub-Commission spe-
cifically have the authority, within its terms of reference, to encourage ratifi-
cation by requesting information directly from governments regarding reasons
for failure to ratify? The second, broader question is: should an international
19 Draft Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights on its Thirty-fourth Session, Res, 19, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/(XXXIV)/CRP.2, at 113 (1981); see also UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.790 (1981)
(draft resolution submitted by five members of the Sub-Commission: Marc Bossuyt of Belgium,
Ibrahim Jimeta of Nigeria, Louis Joinet of France, Syed Masud of India, and Ivan To*evski of
Yugoslavia; Julio Oyhanarte of Argentina was the only member of the working group who did
not join in sponsoring the resolution).20 See Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 35, 35-37 (1978).
21 In 1981 the working group discussed the possibility of adding three more treaties to its mandate:
the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/L.785, at 3 (1981); UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO/87 (1981) (recommendation of several
nongovernmental organizations that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women be included within the working group's purview). The working group,
however, resisted the addition of these new instruments in the belief that it should concentrate its
efforts to be effective.
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organization involve itself in encouraging ratification of its treaties, once
adopted, and if so, to what extent?
As to the first issue, Mr. Gagliardi of Brazil asserted that direct commu-
nication with states is outside the Sub-Commission's competence. However, its
terms of reference of 1948, which were expanded in 1949, seem to contemplate
the receipt of information from governments by mandating that the Sub-Com-
mission is to "undertake studies" in regard to human rights and to perform
other functions delegated by ECOSOC and the Human Rights Commission.
22
The Sub-Commission's request for information from member states follows
a very common practice of the Sub-Commission in particular, and of the United
Nations in general. The Sub-Commission has long studied human rights issues
by means of inquiries to governments. For example, in preparing his Study of
Discrimination in Education, Charles D. Ammoun, who was special rapporteur
of the Sub-Commission, was supported by a note verbale of April 13, 1954,
from the Secretary-General to member governments requesting assistance.
23
Such inquiries to governments have become a standard practice.
24
The working group's invitation to several states for oral presentations, how-
ever, provides a greater opportunity for encouraging ratification and is a sub-
stantial innovation in the Sub-Commission's practice. Within the human rights
field, only the Human Rights Committee organized under the UN Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Racial Committee under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination have
regularly pursued this approach. 25 Nevertheless, the Sub-Commission's work-
ing group does not violate the Sub-Commission's rules or terms of reference
by inviting state representatives to discuss treaty ratification. Rule 69 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of the Economic and Social
Council specifically provides authority for the Sub-Commission to "invite any
State to participate in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to
that State." 26 Hence, the Economic and Social Council has long authorized the
Sub-Commission to pursue the approach it adopted for the working group on
discussions of treaty ratification.
As to the second, broader question: on the one hand, Gagliardi argued that
once an international organization has adopted a treaty and opened it for
22 9 UN ESCOR, Supp. (No. 10) 6, UN Doc. E/CN.4/350 (1949).
23 Ammoun, Study of Discrimination in Education, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/181/Rev.1, at
177 (1957).
24 See, e.g., Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and
Practices, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, at 76 (1960); Santa Cruz, Study of Discrimination
in the Matter of Political Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev.1, at 100-01 (1962); Santa
Cruz, Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/307/Rev.1, at 314 (1971).
25 See, e.g, Buergenthal, Implementing the Racial Convention, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 187, 194
(1977); Fischer, Reporting Under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years
of the Human Rights Committee, 76 AJIL 142 (1982).
26 UNITED NATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE FUNCTIONAL COMMISSIONS OF THE Eco-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, rule 69(2), at 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FUNCTIONAL RULES];
UN JURIDICAL Y.B., UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/6, at 204 (1968). While there was some criticism
at the Human Rights Commission of the Sub-Commission for directly addressing governments,
such criticism was not focused on the working group.
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acceptance, the organization has no authority to take steps to encourage its
entry into force.27 On the other hand, international organizations exist to pro-
mote certain goals that in principle all members share. In pursuit or those goals,
organizations adopt conventions and treaties in accordance with Charter au-
thority. Encouraging the acceptance of those instruments is simply further
promotion of the goals of the organization. As noted above, United Nations
bodies have often encouraged states to ratify instruments. The effect of such
encouragement is not to interfere with a government's sovereign determination
to ratify or not to ratify, but to urge governments to exercise that discretion.
28
Responding to the criticisms of the Sub-Commission, the Director of the UN
Human Rights Division 29 noted that the 1962 advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in regard to Certain Expenses of the United Nations30
provides some guidance about the authority of the Sub-Commission to encourage
ratification of human rights treaties and to communicate directly with govern-
ments. In determining whether peacekeeping expenses were improperly in-
curred by the United Nations, the Court was asked first to consider whether
the peacekeeping activity was improper or unauthorized by the Charter. The
Court responded that "each organ [of the United Nations] must, in the first
place at least, determine its own jurisdiction." 31 This reasoning cculd support
the Sub-Commission, as it determines its own jurisdiction to promote human
rights.32 The establishment of the working group represents the Sub-Com-
mission's effort to organize its work as efficiently as possible. Such an internal
procedural affair has always been within the competence of the Sub-Commis-
sion.
33
The experience of other international organizations confirms the propriety
and efficacy of these techniques. Since 1919, the International Labour Organ-
isation has operated a successful reporting mechanism to encourage ratification
of its conventions. 34 The working group's approach follows the ILO model in
27 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1592, at 9 (1981).
28 Such was the conclusion of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)
in its analysis of the reporting approach as a method for encouraging ratification of treaties. 0.
SCHACHTER, M. NAWAZ, & J. FRIED, TOWARD WIDER ACCEPTANCE OFUN TREA'(*IES 52 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as UNITAR study]; see also I. DETTER, LAW MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 168-70 (1965).
29 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1595, at 8 and 9 (1981); see United Nations Division of Human Rights,
The Role and Competence of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities 20 (internal unpub. memo, June 15, 1981).30 Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962J ICJ REP. 151.
" id. at 168.
32 The ICJ in its advisory opinion, however, was discussing the legal authority of the principal
organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and ihe Secretary-
General. There is some doubt that such broad self-interpretation of mandate would apply to the
Sub-Commission. At least, the parent organs of the Sub-Commission, that is, the Commission on
Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council, possess the authority to alter the mandate
of the Sub-Commission. However, under its present broad mandate, with no express limits on its
right to promote human rights, and with a long, uncriticized practice of pursuing similar activities,
the Sub-Commission might well be entitled, in accordance with the reasoning of the ICJ advisory
opinion, to interpret its own mandate-at least in the first instance.
33 See FUNCTIONAL RULES, supra note 26, rules 21 and 24, at 6-7.
34 ILO CONST. Art. 19, para. 5.
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which member states report on their ratification of ILO conventions and rec-
ommendations. The reports, or the failure of members to report, are examined
by a group of independent experts, the International Labour Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. 35 Supple-
menting the formal reporting procedures, informal discussions between ILO
staff and government representatives during sessions of the International La-
bour Conference have been perhaps the most effective means of resolving tech-
nical difficulties that impede ratification.
36
In 1930 the League of Nations adopted a similar procedure for encouraging
ratification of League conventions. 37 The League's reporting procedure and the
attention it focused on the importance of ratification resulted in a large increase
in ratifications.38 Historical records do not explain why the League's system
of reporting on the status of ratifications was not immediately incorporated into
UN practice, if not the Charter.39 The Economic and Social Council was given
the authority to "make arrangements with the members of the United Nations
and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give
effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling
within its competence made by the General Assembly."40 In practice, ECOSOC
has frequently obtained reports from governments regarding actions taken on
individual resolutions and on groups of recommendations.
41
55 Such reports are included in the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF THE
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
Report III, pt. 3.36 The ILO system has been successful. As of January 1, 1981, the 152 member states of the
ILO had reported over 4,856 ratifications of the then existing 153 ILO conventions. ILO, Chart
of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions (Jan. 1, 1981). See also E. LANDY, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION 203-04 (1966).
37 Resolution of Oct. 3, 1930, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 83, at 12 (1930); for
discussion on the resolution, see id., Spec. Supp. 84, at 213-17 (1930); see also Resolution of Sept.
23, 1926, id., Spec. Supp. 43, at 27 (1926).
In addition to the ILO and League of Nations systems of reporting, constitutional provisions
of some UN specialized agencies authorize similar procedures. WHO CONST., 14 UNTS 185, Art.
20; UNESCO CONST., 4 UNTS 275, Art. VIII; see Ago, La Codification du droit international
et les problimes de sa rialzsation, in RECUEIL D'ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE
1 PAUL GUGGENHEIM 93, 117 (1968); see also another precursor of the working group: Final Act
of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 April to 13 May 1968, UN Doc.
A/CONF.32/41, at 19, 48 (1968).
38 See F. WILCOX, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 133 (1935).
39 This statement is based on such sources as the UNCIO Docs. (1945); UNITED NATIONS,
REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UN Doc. PC/20 (1945);
COMMENTARY ON THE REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
CMD. No. 6734 (1946). See also R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
(1958); L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OFTHE UNITED NATIONS, COMMEN-
TARY AND DOCUMENTS (3d and rev. ed. 1969); N. BENTIVICH & A. MARTIN, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950); J. ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDA-
MENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1946); J. CAMARA, THE RAT-
IFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (1949); Q. WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
UNITED NATIONS (1960); K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW (1967).
40 UN CHARTER, Art. 64, para. 1.
41 ECOSOC regularly reports to the General Assembly under UN Charter Article 15(2) on the
implementation of recommendations by member governments.
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A 1971 study by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research
entitled Toward Wider Acceptance of U.N. Treaties found that it would be
within the competence of the United Nations to institute procedures similar
to those of the ILO.42 The UNITAR study suggested the establishment of a
committee of experts that would systematically review states' positions on treaty
ratification. In the field of human rights, the Sub-Commission's Working Group
on Universal Acceptance of Human Rights Instruments is just such a body.
Problems of Ratification to be Considered by the Working Group
The sessional Working Group on Universal Acceptance of Human Rights
Instruments has just begun its efforts and it may be too soon to assess what
contribution it may ultimately make to encouraging treaty ratification. Nev-
ertheless, based upon the initial governmental replies to the working group's
inquiries about impediments to ratification and the working group's early ses-
sions, several observations and suggestions may be offered with a view toward
maximizing the success of the group. First, following the example of the ILO,
43
the group should focus its attention on certain particularly important treaties.
Even the nine treaties that were identified in its authorizing resolution may
be too many for the group to consider efficiently during the few days available
for meetings. The working group might address one or two treaties at a time
to achieve the greatest effect upon ratifications, for example, by beginning with
the two Covenants, which are the central human rights instruments, and then
proceeding to the other instruments.
Second, the working group might delineate or concentrate on one or two
issues that frequently delay or prevent ratification. It could explore those issues
in detail and identify measures the United Nations might take to assist states
in overcoming their problems. Such an issue was the question of extraterritorial
criminal responsibility raised by the Apartheid Convention, which, as mentioned
above, troubled many governments44 and prompted the working group at its
first sessions to request a study of that issue.45
Several other problems deserve study and attention by the worl ing group.
For example, Australia's reply mentioned the problem of federalism, 46 and the
Senate hearings that discuss this impediment to ratification of the Covenants
were incorporated by reference in the U.S. response. 47 The working group
could determine the extent of this problem and could consult with federal states
like Australia and Canada, which have apparently overcome such difficulties
in ratifying some of the principal treaties. Indeed, the group might convene a
42 UNITAR study, supra note 28, at 16.
43 See, e.g., ILO GB Doe. 208/SC/1/6 (1978).
44 Including those of Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, and Sweden. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452, at 3, 6, 9, and 12 (1980); UN Doe. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/452/Add.4, at 1-2 (1981).
41 See text at note 12 supra.
46 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452, at 3 (1980).47 1d., Add.2; International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senat- Comm. on




discussion at which those countries could offer advice to others encountering
similar impediments to ratification, and thus foster a valuable dialogue among
countries. Specifically, Canada could explain how it has been able to overcome
provincial objections to ratification of the Covenants and the Optional Protocol
to the Civil and Political Covenant. Such a presentation might prove useful to
Australia, which has ratified the Covenants and is still considering the Optional
Protocol, and to the United States. While the U.S. Departments of Justice and
State have attempted to protect state prerogatives regarding the human rights
treaties, they have not generally consulted state officials, as apparently have
Australia and Canada. Perhaps such consultation will clarify which objections
states actually have and which might be overcome.
The working group at its 1981 session found many other problems of
ratification in the governmental replies, but it has not yet fully considered them.
For example, governments gave the following reasons for not ratifying the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
(1) that the title included the word "optional"; (2) that individuals would be
entitled to file complaints against states; and (3) that the procedure in the
Protocol overlapped with regional human rights structures.48 With regard to
the Slavery Convention, one government expressed concern over the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.49 In addition, the working
group's 1981 report had this to say about the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid:
[I]t was noted that the reasons often given by States for not having become
parties to it were that: (a) such States had already become parties to the
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination; (b) in their view, the definition of the crime of apartheid itself
was rather vague; (c) the Convention established extra-territorial criminal
jurisdiction for the crime of apartheid; and (d) there was incompatibility
between the obligations imposed by the Convention and domestic legis-
lation. Incompatibility with domestic legislation was evoked by States
as a reason for not adhering to several other instruments as well.
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A third possible approach that the working group might consider is suggested
by the UNITAR study of 1971, which demonstrated that some impediments
to treaty ratification are not substantive.5 1 An extreme example emerged in the
replies to the working group of Rwanda and the United Republic of Cameroon,
who explained that they lacked the texts of several human rights instruments.
5 2
The Secretary-General promptly supplied the texts.
A number of states, including Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia,
Iran, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Rwanda, Spain, Suriname, the
United States, and Venezuela, indicated that various treaties had been under
4s UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452/Add.3, at 5 (India), 8 (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic),
and 8-9 (USSR) (1981).
49 Id. at 8-9 (USSR).
5o UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.785, at 5-6 (1981).
51 UNITAR study, supra note 28, at 9.
52 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452, at 11 and 13 (1980).
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consideration by administrative or legislative bodies for some period. 53 The
UNITAR study found that treaty ratifications were often delayed by such
nonsubstantive matters as inefficient bureaucratic coordination, administrative
lethargy, the drafting of implementing legislation, and a lack of trained per-
sonnel to consider ratification issues.54 The working group might ask these
countries whether technical assistance or some of UNITAR's ideas for co-
ordinated administrative consideration of treaties might be helpful to them.
Moreover, some of the governments that were considering the treaties assured
the working group that they would complete the ratification process "in the
near future" or in a short time.5 Hence, after an appropriate interval, the
group might inquire of Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico, and the Solomon Islands, for
example, whether they had made any progress or might need assistance.
A fourth approach that the working group might consider derives from the
experience of the ILO.5 6 Certain UN staff members could be assigned re-
sponsibility for offering technical assistance identified by the working group
as necessary for speedy ratification. Papua New Guinea indicated in its reply
that the Covenants may conflict with customs and laws of that country.57 Per-
haps technical assistance and a knowledge of the way the Covenants have been
applied in countries with similar problems might aid the Government of Papua
New Guinea in achieving ratification.
Finally, the Director of the Human Rights Division and his staff could follow
the example of the ILO by holding informal meetings with governmental rep-
resentatives on the difficulties of obtaining acceptance of human rights treaties,
using the working group's material as a basis for discussion. In addition, in
the course of receiving governmental delegations during the sessions of the
General Assembly, the Secretary-General could initiate discussions about rat-
ification of the principal human rights instruments.
Conclusion
The new Working Group on Universal Acceptance of Human Rights In-
struments has the potential of encouraging greater ratification of human rights
treaties, if questions about its competence raised at the 37th session of the
Human Rights Commission do not impede its efforts.
53 Id. at 4, 8, 9, and 11; id., Add.2; id., Add.3, at 3, 5, 6, 7, and 10 (1981).
54 UNITAR study, supra note 28, at 81-92.
55 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452, at 4, 8, and 11 (1980).56 See, e.g., discussion of the Report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations, comments of Mrs. Makabir, Employers' delegate from Trinidad and Tobago
and Vice-Chairman of the committee, 66 ILC, PROC. 42/7, 42/8 (1980):
The ILO is to be commended on the extent to which it gives assistance to countries,
particularly developing countries. . . . An impressive system of direct contacts, missions, na-
tional and international seminars, fellowships and other means of assistance has be an developed
over the years, which has been of great help to developing countries.. . . The progress which
has been achieved as a result is a tribute to the efficacy of this assistance.
See also id. at 42/13 (remarks of Mr. Isacsson, Government delegate from Sweden); id. at 42/20
(remarks of Mr. Haase, Government delegate from the Federal Republic of Germany).
57 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/452/Add.3, at 6 (1981).
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A specific grant of authority to solicit governmental reports and appearances
would be clearly preferable to the current implied authority. If doubt remains
about the competence of the Sub-Commission to assign such tasks to its sessional
working group, ECOSOC and/or the General Assembly should give the nec-
essary authorization. Indeed, a resolution by one of those bodies would endow
the working group with an incontestable mandate, higher visibility, and con-
sequent increased effectiveness. Without such a resolution, however, the work-
ing group would still be able to pursue significant United Nations objectives
while remaining within its mandate. It can continue to encourage the com-
munication of difficulties encountered by states in the ratification process and
to determine what assistance can be given. The group's approach combines
previously tested reporting techniques with an innovative method for open
discussion of human rights treaty ratifications. The present mandate of the
Sub-Commission certainly encompasses such efforts.
The working group's efforts to study and communicate problems commonly
encountered in the ratification of human rights instruments, and to provide
states with assistance, should make it possible to increase the number of states
parties to human rights treaties. Other organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
might also consider such methods for encouraging ratification of their respective
treaties. The ILO and now the Working Group on Encouragement of Universal
Acceptance of Human Rights Instruments could provide valuable models for
other international organizations concerned with the implementation of a variety
of important standards.
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